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are referred to as ￿resistance levels￿ or ￿psychological barriers.￿ In this note we examine 41 years of closing values of the Dow-Jones
index to see if it is useful for predicting future stock market returns.
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On April 17, 1991, the Dow-Jones Industrial Average (djia) closed above 3,000 for the ￿rst time. This
occurrence was widely reported in the ￿nancial press; see Norris (1991) or Sease and Dorfman (1991) for
examples. Prior to this event, some observers claimed that 3,000 was a ￿resistance level￿ or a ￿psychological
barrier.￿ (See, e.g., Torres (1991).)
The ￿nancial press contained similar reports when the djia crossed 1,000 and 2,000, although the be-
haviour was somewhat different in each case. The djia ￿rst touched 1,000 in early 1966; it didn￿t cross that
level again until nearly 17 years later, in late 1982. In 1987 the djia passed through 2,000 and continued to
3,000 in 4 years. It appears that 1,000 was a ￿resistance level￿ while 2,000 was not.
Figure 1 shows 2,163 weekly closing prices of the djia from 1/52 to 6/93.1 One could interpret this ￿gure
as showing that 500 and 1,000 were ￿resistance levels;￿ however, one could also argue that the behavior
exhibited in this ￿gure could have been due to chance alone. In this paper we try to determine which of
these two claims are more consistent with the evidence: does the numerical value of the djia help predict
future returns, or has the historical behavior been due to chance alone?
This is purely an empirical investigation; we want to ￿nd out what the evidence says, and we have no
particular theory in mind about why ￿resistance levels￿ may or may not occur. All we can offer in this regard
is a paragraph from the Wall Street Journal:
￿How can a ￿resistance level￿ exist? Because traders believe it is there. Resistance levels
in market benchmarks can occur when there￿s a consensus that the market can￿t go much
higher. Stock index or average levels become sentiment signals. As market barometers
approach those levels, stock buyers become less aggressive, fearing a turn in the market,
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Fig. 1. djia (weekly close): January 1952—June 1993.
while sellers need less coaching to drop their prices a notch or two.￿ [Torres (1991).]
This passage appears to claim that traders may believe that the level of the djia helps to forecast future
returns in stock prices. If this view is correct, it would be a clear violation of market ef￿ciency.
Donaldson and Kim (1991) have independently investigated some related issues issues involving numer-
ical patterns in the closing prices of the DJIA. However, they do not focus on questions of market ef￿ciency,
which is the main concern of this paper. We discuss the relationship between their results and our results
in section 4.
1. Distribution of the DJIA's digits
We being by examining the distribution of the djia index by the last two digits to the left of the decimal
point. Table 1 summarizes the frequency with which the djia closed at a value whose last two digits were
ij. For example, the entry in row 4, column 3 is p43 =1 :03; this means that the djia closed at a value ending
in ￿43￿ 1.03 percent of the time.
Table 1. Percent of times that the djia Index ends in ij (pij).
January 1952—June 1993: N =1 0 ;449.
i # j ! 0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 pi¢
0 0.82 0.93 0.96 1.15 1.00 0.99 1.08 1.09 0.91 1.00 9.93
1 0.92 1.04 0.97 1.04 0.92 0.88 1.15 0.87 1.00 0.84 9.63
2 0.98 0.88 1.00 0.93 1.09 0.92 1.06 0.95 0.91 0.88 9.60
3 1.05 0.99 1.03 0.85 0.88 0.96 0.95 1.10 0.98 1.04 9.83
4 1.02 0.83 0.87 1.03 0.89 1.07 1.13 1.05 0.86 0.85 9.62
5 0.94 0.89 0.91 0.82 1.05 1.08 0.81 0.81 1.02 1.15 9.49
6 1.03 0.99 0.97 1.24 0.95 1.12 0.96 0.93 1.17 1.10 10.45
7 1.18 1.19 1.04 1.00 1.26 1.31 1.19 1.12 1.08 1.07 11.44
8 0.84 1.03 1.15 1.13 0.96 1.26 1.23 1.21 0.98 0.84 10.63
9 0.97 1.07 1.17 1.03 0.92 0.80 1.00 0.91 0.74 0.78 9.38
p¢j 9.75 9.84 10.07 10.23 9.92 10.39 10.56 10.04 9.64 9.56 100.00
We ￿rst test the null hypothesis that pij =1for all i;j￿i.e., that all two-digit terminations are equally
likely. The sample chi-square statistic is Â2(99) = 153:57. This value is more than adequate to reject the null
hypothesis. Table 1 shows that the terminations in 60￿s, 70￿s, and 80￿s are too frequent; the most frequent
termination of all, 75, occurs 1.31% of the time. Furthermore, the terminations in 89, 98, 99 and 00 are
abnormally rare.
Wenexttestthehypothesisthatclosingsinalldecilesareequallylikely. Thechi-squarestatisticfortesting
the hypothesis that p¢j =1 0for all i is Â2( 9 )=4 8 :47. Again, we clearly reject the null hypothesis. On the
2basis of this evidence we conclude that the closing values of the djia are not uniformly distributed: some
patterns of digits occur signi￿cantly more often than others.
2. Distribution of Returns
We next turn to the relation between stock market returns and the djia￿s last two digits. If century marks
(closing prices at 1100,1200, etc.) are ￿psychological barriers￿ or ￿resistance point￿ then we might expect
that the mean return following a close in the 90s would be lower than the mean return following closes in
other deciles.





where pt is the djia at time t, and dt is the number of days between trading dates t and t+1.I ft corresponds
to a Friday and Monday is the next trading day, then dt =3 .2 We want to test whether the last two digits of
pt have any predictive power for rt. Table 2 shows summary statistics for rt by the corresponding digit in
the 10￿s position of pt.
Table 2. One-day percent return statistics by digit in 10￿s position.
10's quantiles mean variance n
digit max 75% median 25% min
0 4.6034 0.3782 0.0252 -0.3231 -4.9349 0.0157 0.6117 1,038
1 4.0476 0.4128 0.0264 -0.3428 -2.5457 0.0365 0.5142 1,006
2 4.1595 0.3392 0.0207 -0.3107 -3.8926 0.0083 0.4583 1,003
3 5.7154 0.4368 0.0191 -0.3000 -2.9985 0.0783 0.6075 1,027
4 9.6662 0.3781 0.0131 -0.3162 -8.5440 0.0342 0.6804 1,005
5 3.9670 0.3788 0.0029 -0.3465 -7.1555 0.0157 0.7032 992
6 3.1101 0.3868 0.0473 -0.3118 -4.0061 0.0337 0.4947 1,092
7 4.5787 0.3529 0.0282 -0.3104 -4.7177 0.0189 0.4740 1,195
8 3.2216 0.3649 0.0234 -0.2953 -3.0376 0.0353 0.4376 1,111
9 4.7814 0.4134 0.0300 -0.2883 -2.4200 0.0894 0.5305 980
All 9.6662 0.3857 0.0245 -0.3140 -8.5440 0.0362 0.5485 10,449
The largest mean return (0.0894%) following a day when the djia closes in the 90￿s; the smallest occurred
when the djia closed in the 20￿s. The mean return following a close in the 90￿s is 2.5 times as large as the
unconditional mean return. This is a large effect: on an annualized basis the unconditional mean return was
about 14% while the annualized mean return following a close in the 90￿s was about 38%. Contrary to our
initial expectations, the century marks do not seem to represent a ￿barrier￿ or a ￿resistance point;￿ rather
they seem to represent a ￿launch pad!￿
In order to test the signi￿cance of the difference of means, we assume that the returns in each decile are
independent Normal draws from populations with known variance equal to the estimated variance. As we
have seen the mean return if the djia ended in the 90￿s was 0.0894%; the mean return if it ended in any other
decile was 0.0307%. The test statistic is
¹ r90 ¡ ¹ rother
^ ¾90 p
n90 + ^ ¾other p
nother
=1 :90;
2 Since pt+1 = pt expfln(pt+1=pt)g it follows that rt is the continuous-time rate of return for the period between t and t + 1. Since we
want to have periods of equal length, we divide by the number of days between trading days￿i.e., whenever we have a holiday or
weekend the computed rt is an average rate of return. Out of the 10,449 observations, 8,130 (77.81%) have dt = 1 (1.69% have dt =2 ,
18.35% have dt = 3, 2.12% have dt = 4 and 0.04% have dt = 5). We think that calendar returns are the theoretically correct measure of
returns, however since trading-day returns are widely used in the literature we also computed all the tables using trading-day returns
￿nding no qualitative differences.
3which has a p-value of 0.0287.3
3. Robustness of the Results
The results of the last section suggest that the growth of the djia accelerates when it moves into the 90￿s.
We found this surprising; even more surprising was the magnitude of the effect. We decided to see if the
results stood up to variation in the sample period. Accordingly, we computed the values of pij in four non-
overlappingsub-samples,eachwith2,612observations. Whiletheconclusionthatnotallterminationsoccur
with the same frequency still holds for each of the four samples, the most and least frequent terminations
vary with the sample chosen. This means that the results from the previous section are not robust with
respect to the sample interval. Table 3 shows a summary.
Table 3. Percent of times that the ten￿s digit of the djia ends in i.
Four non-overlapping samples, each with N =2 ;612.
Sample 1 Sample 2 Sample 3 Sample 4
i 1/1/52{4/18/62 4/19/62{10/5/72 10/6/72{2/9/83 2/10/83{6/10/93
0 10.38 9.95 9.15 10.22
1 9.57 9.95 8.46 10.53
2 8.50 9.26 10.15 10.49
3 6.55 9.49 12.29 10.99
4 7.62 10.49 11.41 8.96
5 7.01 9.61 11.79 9.57
6 13.06 8.81 9.84 10.11
7 15.39 10.68 10.15 9.53
8 12.86 11.37 8.46 9.84
9 9.07 10.38 8.31 9.76
Â2(9) 200.04 13.33 49.18 8.16
p-values 0.00 0.15 0.00 0.52
While in the ￿rst sample, the djia ends in the 60￿s 13.06% of the time, in the second sample it does so
only 8.81% of the time. Similar signi￿cant variations can be observed for most digits and positions. The Â2
statistics reject the hypothesis that the ten￿s digit is distributed uniformly in two of the four subsamples.
Several interesting hypothesis suggested by table 2 are rejected for, at least, three of the four samples
considered.4 It appears that the high mean return following closes in the 90￿s is only supported by a small
fraction of the data, namely, the behavior of the market during the ￿roaring Eighties.￿ We concluded that
this effect does not appear to be a stable representation of the underlying data-generating process. Table 4
shows the descriptive statistics for the return series in each of the four samples. Again, there seems to be no
particular pattern that holds across the four subsets.
4. Ignorance and Randomness
Wenowhaveanapparentanomaly: thedigitsofthedjiaappeartoexhibitcertainpatterns, whilethe returns
conditional on the digit realization are more-or-less random. Perhaps we should reconsider our initial null
hypothesis. Is there any reason to expect that the digits of a market index should be uniformly distributed?
To develop some intuition, consider a standardized Normal variable. One might ￿rst expect that each of
the ten possible values of the ￿rst decimal digit, say, is equally likely. However, since the density function is
monotonicallydecreasingwhenwemoveawayfromzero,itfollowsthatthedigitmostlikelytoappearinany
positionis0,then1,andsoonupto9. Exactprobabilitiescaneasilybecomputedfromastandardprobability
3 This is the simplest possible test we could imagine; we also estimated a dummy-variable ARIMA (i.e., intervention) model (Box
and Tiao (1975)) which led to the same conclusion.
4 Both ANOVA and nonparametric (Wilcoxon) tests were done to test various hypothesis regarding different returns, different
absolute movements jrtj, different variance of the returns, etc. We couldn￿t ￿nd any appealing regularity across the four samples.
4Table 4. One-day return statistics by digit in 10￿s position:
Four non-overlapping samples.
10's Quantiles
Mean Variance N i Max 75% Median 25% Min
Sample 1: 1/2/52|4/18/62
0 1.8096 0.3689 0.0241 -0.2360 -2.2231 0.0557 0.2922 271
1 4.0476 0.3700 0.0570 -0.2610 -1.8669 0.0731 0.3371 250
2 2.6313 0.2432 0.0533 -0.2019 -2.1451 0.2320 0.3072 222
3 2.4259 0.4677 0.0269 -0.2250 -1.8044 0.0821 0.3576 171
4 1.5840 0.3171 0.0408 -0.2555 -2.0553 0.0049 0.3082 199
5 2.2508 0.4285 0.0565 -0.2349 -2.1700 0.0981 0.3707 183
6 1.8743 0.2917 0.0451 -0.1736 -1.7015 0.0623 0.2851 341
7 1.7264 0.2972 0.0425 -0.1927 -1.6305 0.0536 0.2522 402
8 1.4785 0.3264 0.0534 -0.2682 -2.2553 0.0275 0.2506 336
9 2.0053 0.3607 0.0084 -0.2541 -1.5353 0.0638 0.3140 237
All 4.0476 0.3319 0.0436 -0.2290 -2.2553 0.0531 0.2979 2,612
Sample 2: 4/19/62|10/5/72
0 1.4688 0.3247 0.0313 -0.2772 -1.9038 0.0160 0.3227 260
1 1.6417 0.3945 0.0350 -0.2784 -2.5457 0.0341 0.3302 260
2 2.1438 0.3000 0.0423 -0.2222 -1.7304 0.0500 0.2551 242
3 4.9517 0.4007 -0.0132 -0.2666 -2.9307 0.0485 0.5020 248
4 1.7469 0.3135 0.0128 -0.2343 -1.9068 0.0665 0.2910 274
5 3.2821 0.3235 -0.0120 -0.2979 -2.0741 0.0358 0.3757 251
6 3.1101 0.3532 0.0035 -0.3166 -2.2613 0.0266 0.4194 230
7 4.5787 0.3030 0.0090 -0.2875 -1.9419 0.0050 0.3926 279
8 2.7125 0.3112 0.0211 -0.2671 -1.7583 0.0189 0.3456 297
9 1.8001 0.2911 0.0176 -0.2483 -2.4200 0.0228 0.3268 271
All 4.9157 0.3301 0.0160 -0.2678 -2.9307 0.0320 0.3541 2,612
Sample 3: 10/6/72|2/9/83
0 4.6034 0.3653 -0.2800 -0.5205 -2.5630 -0.0107 0.9575 239
1 2.8970 0.5177 -0.0233 -0.5174 -2.4186 0.0010 0.7862 221
2 4.1595 0.4599 -0.0275 -0.4542 -2.1218 -0.0048 0.6178 265
3 3.9443 0.5079 0.0311 -0.3541 -2.8514 0.0842 0.7414 321
4 3.4521 0.5414 0.0204 -0.4968 -2.9340 0.0502 0.7031 298
5 3.9670 0.3930 -0.0749 -0.5601 -2.4773 -0.0135 0.8704 308
6 2.6122 0.4981 0.0197 -0.5177 2.6122 -0.0206 0.6908 257
7 3.0269 0.3976 -0.0373 -0.5213 -2.2675 -0.0459 0.6376 265
8 3.2216 0.4355 0.0192 -0.4644 -3.0376 0.0012 0.6415 221
9 4.7814 0.6102 0.0280 -0.3954 -2.4023 0.1322 0.9046 217
All 4.7814 0.4641 -0.0041 0.4805 -3.1820 0.0175 0.7528 2,612
Sample 4: 2/10/83|6/10/93
0 4.4665 0.4768 0.0416 -0.3905 -4.9349 -0.0018 0.9146 267
1 3.0541 0.4458 0.0000 -0.3832 -2.5424 0.0340 0.6342 275
2 2.9675 0.3472 0.0265 -0.4523 -3.8926 -0.0277 0.6076 274
3 5.7154 0.4170 0.0160 -0.3172 -2.9985 0.0952 0.7027 287
4 9.6662 0.3790 -0.0090 -0.3735 -8.5440 0.0009 1.4292 234
5 2.7379 0.4009 0.0351 -0.3515 -7.1555 -0.0290 1.0688 250
6 3.0406 0.4643 0.0986 -0.2758 -4.0061 0.0559 0.6413 264
7 2.9127 0.4517 0.0433 -0.3318 -4.7177 0.0476 0.7481 249
8 2.6792 0.4269 0.0142 -0.3257 -2.0704 0.0936 0.6137 257
9 3.1619 0.4685 0.0867 -0.2853 -1.9243 0.1474 0.6261 255
All 9.6662 0.4257 0.0378 -0.3461 -8.5440 0.0420 0.7895 2,612
5table. For instance, for the ￿rst digit to the right of the decimal point the probabilities for i =0 ;1;:::;9 are
(in percentages): 13.61, 12.89, 12.07, 11.25, 10.43, 9.55, 8.75, 7.94, 7.14, and 6.38. The frequency of occurrence
of the various digits in a Normal random variable is far from uniform!
Ofcourse,asequenceofIIDdrawsofaNormalrandomvariableisnotaverygoodmodelforthebehavior
ofastockmarketindex. Insteadletusconsiderthemostpopularandsimplestpossiblemodelusedforstock
returns, a random walk with drift of the form
lnqt ¡ lnqt¡1 = ¹ + at;a t » IID N(0;¾ a): (1)
This is a Geometric Random Walk Model; it implies that the one-day return, st =l nqt ¡lnqt¡1, is Normally
distributed around its expectation, ¹. Equivalently, we can write
qt = qt¡1e¹+at (2)
We generated ￿ve hundred series of 10,000 observations each for qt according to equation (2) for different
values of (¹;¾a;q 0).5 We then examined this simulated data to see if there were any ￿patterns￿ in the
distribution of digits. The simulation results that we present in the next sections are not sensitive to the
values of the parameters so we only show the results for ¹ =0 :025=100 and ¾a =0 :80=100 (in line with the
statistics shown on table 2) and q0 = 250 (since it was approximately the level of the djia at the beginning
of our sample).
It is important to recognize that we are not claiming that a Geometric Random Walk is a good model
for the djia. We know that it can be improved upon. We are simply claiming that if an extremely simple
model like (1) can reproduce the observed anomalities displayed by the actual djia, then we do not have
any reason to believe that these anomalities are evidence of market inef￿ciency￿they could easily be due
to chance alone.
4.1. Simulation Results
We applied a Â2 test for a uniform distribution of ten￿s digit to these 500 series of 10,000 observations. At
a 5% signi￿cance level we rejected the uniform distribution hypothesis 98.4% of the time. Even though
the simulated returns follow a random walk by construction, the ten￿s digit is distributed in a decidedly
non-uniform way! Apparently the observed ￿pattern￿ in the distribution of the ten￿s digit could easily arise
if the djia followed a pure random walk.
Table 5. Observed distribution of pi¢ in the simulations.
Quantiles Observed
i Mean Std Dev DJIA
95% 75% Median 25% 5% pi¢
0 11.69 10.62 9.81 9.05 7.90 9.82 1.17 9.85
1 12.07 10.54 9.74 8.98 7.81 9.79 1.23 9.46
2 11.96 10.55 9.82 9.03 7.85 9.85 1.23 9.53
3 12.50 10.65 9.95 9.18 8.10 10.03 1.27 9.78
4 13.86 10.93 10.10 9.34 8.26 10.18 1.25 9.56
5 12.54 11.04 10.18 9.42 8.29 10.25 1.28 9.48
6 12.25 10.92 10.15 9.35 8.24 10.18 1.23 10.50
7 12.18 10.89 9.98 9.24 8.16 10.08 1.22 11.68
8 11.90 10.75 9.93 9.24 7.95 9.96 1.19 10.74
9 11.94 10.58 9.86 9.08 7.99 9.87 1.15 9.41
What about the high excess return when the djia closes in the 90￿s? Could this be the result of chance
alone? We have already shown that we can reject the hypothesis that the mean return conditioned on decile
5 The routines ran1 and gasdev from Press et al. (1986), pp. 714—16, were used to generate the Normal variates.
6is the same for all deciles and we saw earlier that the return when the djia lands in the 90￿s is ￿signi￿cantly￿
greater than when it lands elsewhere.
However, it is not obvious that this is the correct comparison. The one-day expected (i.e., mean) returns
conditioned on closing digits of the djia comprise a set of 10 random numbers. In our sample, the largest of
these numbers was the one associated with closing prices in the 90￿s and we showed that this was unusually
large compared to average return. But of course it is unusually large￿we performed this test precisely
because the return in the 90￿s was the largest return! The relevant sampling distribution to use is not the
distribution of the average return, but rather the distribution of the maximum of the 10 conditional returns.
It is not dif￿cult to compute this distribution. Let f(r) be a probability density for the one-day return.
Draw 10,000 realizations of r and compute the mean one-day returns by decile. Look at the value of the
maximum of these ten numbers. Now repeat this 500 times and plot the distribution of this maximum. This
is the relevant sampling distribution with which to compare the ￿unusually large￿ return of 0.0894.
We performed this experiment using two different choices for the density f(r). One was the Normal
distribution used in the previous section. The other was the actual frequency distribution of one-day
returns. The use of the frequency distribution is essentially a bootstrap method; see Efron and Tibshirani
(1986) for discussion of this statistical technique. We used a bootstrap method because it is well-known that
the distribution of one-day returns has fatter tails than a Normal distribution, and we were worried that this
would affect the distribution of our test statistic.
Table 6 shows the distribution of the maximum of the mean simulated returns when the underlying return
is taken to be drawn from the Normal distribution and the empirical distribution.










Std Err 0.0006 0.0006
Variance 0.0002 0.0002
A remarkable feature of table 6 is that both distributions ￿Normal and empirical￿ are very similar. This
occurs despite the fact that the observed distribution of returns from which we￿re sampling is clearly non-
Normal. Figure 2 shows a Normal probability graph for the observed returns on the djia￿ the sampled
distribution on the horizontal axis and the standard normal on the vertical one.6 It is evident that the
distribution of returns is very leptokurtic. (The empirical distribution has a bigger mass until somewhere
between 1.5 and 2 standard deviations from the mean; after that point, the normal has a higher mass in any
symmetric interval from the mean.) Apparently the symmetry and the large number of observations are
more powerful than the fat tails. In other words, the central limit theorem is at work; at least in this instance
a test based on Normal sampling theory is a valid tool, despite the fact that the returns are not Normally
distributed.
Table 2 showed that the mean return when the djia ended in the 90￿s was 0.0894. Table 6 shows that
a value smaller than this will be observed about 86% of the time. This means that the observed return of
0.0894 is not signi￿cant at the the conventional levels of statistical signi￿cance. Remember that this mean
return is computed using a sample of about ten thousand observations. A test that is not signi￿cant with
6 In a normal probability graph we have values from the sample and from the normal distribution paired by fractiles. If the sampled
values had been generated by a normal distribution, we￿d expect to see a straight line. Formal statistical tests can be based on the
correlation coef￿cient between the two series.
7this many observations must be considered relatively weak evidence against the null hypothesis. Coupled
with the fact that the 90￿s decile did not have unusually high returns in our four subsamples, we have little
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Fig. 2. Normal probability graph for the djia return.
Donaldson and Kim (1991) independently examined the question of market ef￿ciency using regression
analysis. They found no signi￿cant relationship between the returns in period t and the last two-digits of
the closing price in period t¡1. They conclude that ￿::: knowing what value the djia closed yesterday :::
does not help predict the return Rt for today.￿ This is certainly consistent with our ￿ndings. However, our
￿ndings are considerably stronger: the Donaldson-Kim regression analysis assumes a linear relationship
between closing prices and next-day returns, while our analysis allows for an arbitrary relationship.
5. Conclusion
InourinitialinvestigationwefoundthatthedistributionoftheDow-Jones￿digitswasdecidednon-uniform,
and that the mean return conditional on ending in the ninth decile was three times as large as the mean
return elsewhere. We then asked whether this evidence was signi￿cant in the statistical sense.
First we showed that the phenomenon was not robust in subsamples: the mean return varies with the
closing decile, but in a decidedly non-uniform way. When we looked at the data from a simulated random-
walk model we found that it looked very much like the actual data: the distribution of the closing decile is
simply not uniform. The observed distribution of closing values of the djia does not appear to be unusual
compared to the distribution resulting from a geometric random walk.
We then examined the distribution of the returns. Although we could easily reject the hypothesis that
the returns were the same for each decile, which return was largest seems to vary with the sample. The
observed mean return of 0.0894 was large compared to the average return, but it was not signi￿cant at
the usual con￿dence level using the distribution of the maximum of the returns in the ten deciles. Our
conclusion from all this is that, contrary to initial impressions, there is little if any predictive power in the
closing values of the djia.
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